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RESUMEN 
La literatura existente ha asumido que el efecto de la sobre-educación es 
constante a lo largo de la distribución condicional de salarios. En este artículo 
usamos la regresión cuantílica con datos de 12 países europeos para mostrar 
que las diferencias entre segmentos de la distribución son de hecho grandes. 
Sobretodo, analizamos hasta qué punto la sobre-educación está relacionada 
con la falta de habilidades. El hecho de diferenciar entre segmentos de la 
distribución de salarios nos permite diferenciar grupos de trabajadores por su 
habilidad. Así encontramos que la penalización por sobre-educación es incluso  
mayor entre trabajadores con habilidad alta que entre los de habilidad baja.  
 
Palabras clave: Rendimiento de la educación, sobre-educación, regresión 
cuantílica, heterogeneidad en la habilidad. 
 
ABSTRACT 
The overeducation literature has typically assumed that the effect of 
overeducation on wages is constant across the conditional wage distribution. In 
this paper we use quantile regression and data from 12 European countries to 
show that differences across segments of the distribution are indeed large. 
Moreover, we investigate to what extent overeducation is related to (the lack of) 
unobserved skills. By differentiating between segments of the distribution, we 
discriminate between groups of workers with different skills. We find that the 
detrimental effects of overeducation among the high-skilled are even larger than 
among the low-skilled. This finding lends support to the view that overeducation 
is an event that reduces the worker’s potential productivity, regardless of his 
skills. 
 
Keywords: Returns to education, overeducation, quantile regression, skills 
heterogeneity. 
 































Investing in human capital is a key tool for economic progress and, as such, 
a major policy issue for most governments. However, a significant 
proportion of the labour force in developed countries has more education 
than is actually required for their jobs, i.e., is overeducated
1. This 
phenomenon raises serious efficiency concerns. Presumably, overeducated 
workers do not make full use of their skills, some of them acquired through 
costly education, resulting into a waste of resources for the economy, the 
firm and the individual. From a temporal perspective, furthermore, the 
overeducation phenomenon warns that the real economic benefits of the 
rapid educational expansion that has characterized developed economies 
in recent decades might be lower than previously thought. 
 
In this paper, we use data from the European Community Household Panel 
to explore the extent and wage effects of overeducation in Europe. Even 
though this topic has been addressed for a variety of countries and years, 
up to date there is little comparable evidence for Europe. Major differences 
between the studies arise not only from crucial differences in the model 
specifications but also from the use of different definitions of overeducation, 
diverging datasets and differently defined sample of individuals. This paper 
contributes to fill this gap by using a common wage equation, the same 
definition of overeducation, and comparable data from a set of European 
countries. An advantage of our study over previous research is, therefore, 
comparability. To our eyes, this is a key ingredient when attempting to 
establish stylized facts regarding the overeducation phenomenon. 
 
As a second contribution, we use an econometric approach that is quite 
                                                 
1 Using data from 25 countries, Groot and Van den Brink (2000) find that an average of one fourth 
of the working population is overeducated. This proportion ranges from about 10% to 40% in the set 




























new in the overeducation literature: quantile regression (QR)
2. This 
approach presents two appealing features. First, the literature to date has 
typically assumed that the impact of overeducation on wages is uniform 
over the conditional wage distribution. Within this context, the switch from 
matched to mismatched work can be trivially represented by a shift of the 
conditional wage distribution. This shift, which represents the percentage 
wage differential between an overeducated worker and his well-matched 
counterpart, is assumed to be constant across conditional quantiles. With 
QR, in turn, we can measure the impact of overeducation on wages at 
different points of the distribution, thus describing changes not only in the 
location but also in the shape of the distribution. In this paper, we ask 
whether wage dispersion among the overeducated is larger than among the 
adequately educated. The results have potential implications for the 
inequality effects of an increase in the incidence of overeducation in 
Europe.   
 
Second, the QR approach allows for a non-trivial interaction between the 
explanatory variables and unobserved factors related to productivity. 
Conditional on observable characteristics, workers located at higher 
quantiles of the wage distribution are precisely those who have more 
productive skills (due to ability, motivation, better academic credentials and 
other unmeasured characteristics affecting individual-specific productivity). 
Thus, if the conditional distribution of wages emerges from the underlying 
distribution of unobserved skills, then differences in the overeducation wage 
effect between workers at high-pay and low-pay jobs can be interpreted as 
differences between workers with high and low unobservable skills. While in 
most other papers the effect of overeducation on wages is estimated for a 
representative individual with average skills, in this paper we provide 
                                                 
2 The quantile regression model was first introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978). For a survey of 
these models and some applications, see Buchinsky (1998), Fitzenberger et al. (2001), and Koenker 




























snapshots of the wage effects of overeducation within narrowly defined skill 
groups
3.   
 
Most of the overeducation debate has gravitated around the question of to 
what extent the incidence of overeducation entails a productivity loss. It 
may be the case that the overeducated are in some way less able and lack 
some of the abilities and skills required to do a job commensurate with their 
level of education. In this case, their lower wages would be due to the lack 
of adequate skills, rather than the result of a true mismatch. This paper 
contributes to the debate by exploring the effects of over-education for 
different skills groups. If overeducation was a consequence of less 
capacity, as some authors argue, then its effects should be concentrated in 
the lower segments of the conditional wage distribution, i.e., amongst the 
less skilled. In turn, we find that workers located at the upper quantiles of 
the distribution, i.e., workers whose unobserved skills make them highly 
productive, are also penalized due to overeducation. Our interpretation is 
that the incidence of overeducation is not a mere statistical outcome arising 
from the lack of unobservable skills. Rather, it appears to be the result of 
                                                 
3 Some authors have explored the interplay between educational mismatches and unobserved skills 
using panel data (Bauer, 2002), instrumental variables (Dolton and Silles, 2001) and proxies of 
skills (Chevalier, 2003, McGuiness, 2003a). These approaches present, however, their own 
limitations. First, the use of panel data implicitly assumes that the transitions of workers from the 
status “overeducated” to “non-overeducated” are exogenous. To the extent that these transitions are 
affected by those unobservable characteristics affecting productivity (for instance, if individuals 
with more ability are more prone to abandon mismatched work), panel data estimates may be 
subject to selection bias. Second, the instrumental variables approach requires finding instruments 
that are related to wages and, at the same time, unrelated to overeducation. Despite appealing, this 
is not a straightforward task. At the international level, furthermore, differences in the quality and 
validity of the instruments (if any) preclude conducting any comparative work. A similar argument 
applies to the use of skill measures. Our econometric approach is, therefore, a working 
compromise to provide international evidence and, at the same time, explore the interplay between 




























allocative inefficiency, i.e., an imperfect matching between the worker’s 
productivity potential and the job’s productivity ceiling.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we review the literature on 
overeducation and highlight the most relevant theoretical approaches that 
have been put forward to explain the phenomenon. In Section 2 we present 
the dataset and variables, including the indicators of overeducation used in 
the paper, and provide summary statistics of relevant variables. In Section 
3 we present the quantile regression model. The results and their 
implications are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 contains the 
concluding remarks. The paper includes an Appendix with a description of 
the variables used in the regressions. 
 
1. Economic framework 
 
Overeducation describes the extent to which an individual possesses a 
level of education in excess of that which is required for his job. Even 
though the incidence of overeducation is found to differ across countries, 
datasets and measurement methods, it is well established that a significant 
proportion of the labour force has more education than is required in their 
jobs. 
 
There is consisting evidence that overeducated workers earn less than their 
well-matched counterparts. The estimated differential amounts to 12% in 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000), 18% in Dolton and Silles (2003), and 27% in 
Chevalier (2003) for the UK, 11% in Cohn and Kahn (1995) and 13% in 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) for the US, 26% in Groot (1993) for Holland 
and 8% in Kiker et al. (1997) for Portugal. Other studies differentiate 
between those years required to match the educational requirement of the 
job and those years that exceed the education level needed at the job. The 




























than the return to required education (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981, Hartog 
and Oosterbeek, 1988, Sicherman, 1991, Alba-Ramírez, 1993). 
 
Overall, this evidence represents a challenge to Becker’s (1964) Human 
Capital Theory. The prediction of HCT that individuals are paid by their 
marginal product, which in turn will be determined by their level of human 
capital, is questioned when researchers find that workers who apparently 
have the same level of human capital earn different wages, depending on 
whether or not they are overeducated. This evidence could be rationalized 
within the HCT framework if educational mismatches were found to be a 
short run phenomenon, that is, the consequence of transitory disequilibria 
that take place while firms adjust their production processes in order to 
utilize their workers human capital fully or, alternatively, while workers find a 
more appropriate job through job search. Despite some earlier works 
support this view (Sicherman, 1991, Alba-Ramirez, 1993), recent empirical 
research indicates that this explanation is not an open road, as a 
substantial fraction of workers remain in jobs for which they are 
overqualified during long periods (Robst, 1995, Rubb, 2003a, Dolton and 
Vignoles, 2000, McGuinness, 2003a). 
 
One alternative road is to admit that the earnings equation framework lacks 
adequate controls for a variety of characteristics that may affect both the 
probability of taking up mismatched work and earnings. In this case, the 
wage effects of overeducation would be the result of an omitted variables 
problem, rather than a real economic problem. Thus, for example, less 
formal measures of human capital, such as tenure and on-the-job training, 
may act as substitutes of formal schooling (substitution hypothesis). 
Similarly, the overeducated may be in some way less able and lack some of 
the abilities and skills required to do a job commensurate with their level of 




























penalty would be a reflection of the lower human capital implied by these 
shortages, and overeducation itself, a mere statistical trick. 
 
The evidence supporting these arguments is however limited. Consistent 
with the substitution hypothesis, Duncan and Hoffman (1981), Sicherman 
(1991), and Sloane et al. (1999) find that overeducated workers tend to 
have lower levels of tenure and training. However, Groot (1996) argues that 
there exist a cohort effect rather than a substitution effect: younger workers, 
who are more educated, find it difficult to enter in high-qualified jobs since 
older, less educated workers, have already taken these jobs. In the same 
vein, Groot (1993) and Alba-Ramirez (1993) find nothing to support that on-
the-job training is treated by employers as substitutes of formal education. 
Moreover, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) find that the extent and wage effects 
of overeducation are significant among workers with similar levels of tenure 
and experience. 
 
In support to the ability-skills hypothesis, Groot (1996) finds that the pay 
penalty of overeducation increases with tenure. The interpretation is that as 
employers find out the real capabilities of their workers, they tend to 
discriminate the overeducated due to their lower ability. Sloane et al. (1999) 
report that, probably due to fewer competencies, overeducated workers 
have lower chances of being promoted. This evidence, however, is less 
convincing when confronted with studies that explicitly control for skill and 
ability heterogeneity. McGuiness (2003b) and Chevalier (2003) extend the 
earnings equation to control for skill differences, and find that in the 
resulting model the pay penalty of overeducation is still large and 
significant. Bauer (2002) uses panel data to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. His results show that about 30% of the estimated penalty 
cannot be accounted for by unobserved individual effects. McGuiness 
(2003a) and Green et al. (1999) stress the importance of differentiating 




























(2003a) finds that a large proportion of the wage penalty associated with 
being overeducated is independent of the level of skill utilization within 
firms. Similarly, Green et al. (1999) find that the correlation between actual 
and required skills is far from being perfect even among non-overeducated 
workers. Moreover, the effects of overeducation are found to be roughly as 
large as the effects of overskilling. Finally, Mcguiness and Bennet (2006) 
use quantile regression to differentiate between high-skill and low-skill 
workers and find that female overeducation decreases wages also among 
the high-skilled. 
 
On the basis of this evidence, there is scope to conclude that the central 
predictions of HCT are unlikely to be fully explained by gaps in the earnings 
equation, even though including job characteristics and some form of skill 
and ability heterogeneity control can importantly affect the estimated 
relationship between overeducation and wages. This scenario has lead 
researchers to interpret the overeducation phenomenon within the context 
of alternative theories of the labour market. From the supply-side 
perspective, Carrier Mobility theory (CMT, Galor and Sicherman, 1990) 
suggests that workers with high levels of formal education accept positions 
for which they are apparently overeducated whilst they gain experience and 
occupation-specific human capital through training. The acquired skills are 
then used to move towards higher occupation levels where they make full 
use of their qualifications. Job Competition Theory (JCT, Thurow, 1975) 
assumes that unemployed individuals are located in a particular job queue. 
Once they get the job, they are paid a wage that is already given for that 
particular job cell. This view emphasizes the importance of a person’s 
relative position in the job queue. Specifically, over-investment in education 
would be the individual’s optimal response to protect or improve his position 
in the queue. In the same spirit, Signalling Theory (ST, Spence, 1973) 
highlights the role of education (and excess education) as a screening 




























(ECH, van der Meer and Wielers, 1996) states that large organisations 
and/or firms in the financial and professional services sector rely heavily on 
educational credentials due to the difficulties to measure workers 
productivity.  
 
Another group of theories concentrate on the inefficient matching between 
supply and demand forces. Assignment Theory (AT, Sattinger, 1993) 
stresses that marginal product and thereby wages are determined by the 
human capital supplied by the worker and, at the same time, by the 
requirements and productivity ceilings of the job. As a result of the 
assignment process, some workers are misallocated to jobs for which they 
do not have comparative advantage and, consequently, end up earning 
lower wages. Within this context, overeducation is nothing but a form of 
allocative inefficiency. Matching Theory (MT, Jovanovic, 1979) stresses this 
view by focusing on search costs and imperfect information as the reasons 
for imperfect matches.  
 
2. Data and Variables 
 
We use data from the last wave (2001) of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP, henceforth). This survey contains personal and 
labour market characteristics, including wage, hours worked, tenure, 
experience, sector, firm size, marital status and immigrant condition, among 
other variables. Individuals are asked to report the maximum level of 
education that they have completed according to three categories based on 
the ISCED-97 classification (OECD, 2003): less than upper secondary, 
upper secondary and tertiary education. 
  
We use the same estimation procedure and population group for all 
countries. Our estimating sub-sample consists on private sector men who 




























hours a week, and not employed in the agricultural sector. Self-employed 
individuals, as well as those whose main activity status is paid 
apprenticeship, training, and unpaid family worker have been excluded from 
the sample. The case of women is disregarded on account of the extra 
complication of potential selectivity bias. Workers with a monthly wage rate 
that is less than 10% or over 10 times the average wage have also been 
excluded.  
 
Several methods to measure overeducation have been proposed in the 
literature, with each method having its own advantages and limitations. 
Here, we use the worker’s self-assessment regarding the match between 
the worker’s skills and the firm’s job requirements
4. Following Alba-Ramirez 
and Blazquez (2002) and Budría and Moro-Egido (2006), we use two 
questions included in the ECHP, 
•  (Q1) Do you feel that you have skills or qualifications to do a more 
demanding job than the one you have now? 
 
This information allows us to identify the group of ‘overqualified’ workers. 
However, over-qualification represents, when taken alone, a weak definition 
of mismatch: many workers identified as overqualified have an adequate 
job match when their skills acquired through training and education are 
evaluated to determine the match’s quality. Thus, in order to strengthen our 
criterion, we consider an additional question included in the ECHP, 
 
                                                 
4 The education level needed in a job can be assessed i) subjectively, ii) by professional job analysts, 
or iii) described by the mean education level in that type of jobs (see Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). 
Our choice of the first method (given by data availability) is not expected to be crucial in 
determining the results of the paper. McGoldrick and Robst (1996), Battu et al. (2000), Groot and 
Van den Brink (2000b) and Rubb (2004) explore the extent to which the various methods yield 
different estimates of the incidence and wage effects of overeducation. Despite concerns relating to 
poor correlation between the various measures, the authors report that the alternative approaches 




























•  (Q2) Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills 
needed for your present type of work? 
 
This information allows us to identify those workers that are ‘incorrectly 
qualified’. Throughout the paper, we will use a strong definition of mismatch 
by restricting the sample of mismatched workers to those individuals that 
answer ‘yes’ to Q1 and ‘no’ to Q2, that is, individuals who are overqualified 
and, at the same time, incorrectly qualified
5. We will abuse language 
somewhat and will call these workers, simply, the ‘overeducated’
6.  
 
In Table 1 we report summary statistics of the distribution of education 
groups and the extent of educational mismatches. To provide a more 
illuminating view, we report the incidence of overqualification, incorrect 
qualification, and the combination of the two, overeducation. The first 
column reports the averages for the pooled sample. The incidence of 
overqualification ranges from 41.6% in Portugal to 68.5% in Belgium, at an 
average of 59.5%. The incidence of incorrect qualification is somewhat 
lower, ranging from 20.5% in Germany to 68.1% in Portugal at an average 
of 42.5%. It is interesting to note that while over-qualification is more 
frequent in those countries with higher education levels (Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland and Germany), incorrect qualification appears to be related to low 
educational attainments (France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
                                                 
5 As Sloane (2002) puts it, in most measures of overeducation “reference is made to the level of 
education rather than the type of education. Thus a worker may still be mismatched if the level of 
education is appropriate, but its type inappropriate, such as an English graduate being hired as a 
statistician” (p. 7). Our definition is consistent with the view that educational mismatches are due 
to excess qualifications as well as to incorrect qualifications. 
6 We are aware that workers who are incorrectly qualified can be hardly regarded as ‘over-
educated’, as their formal education and training did not provide them with the skills needed at their 
jobs. However, we maintain the nomenclature in order to be consistent with previous works, which 





























7. As a result of these two opposing effects, the proportion of 
overeducated individuals is only weakly related to the country’s education 
level. This proportion ranges from 14.3% in Germany to 30.4% in Italy and 
is on average 21.9%.  
 
3. The model 
 
The quantile regression model can be written as 
 
where  Xi is the vector of exogenous variables and βθ is the vector of 
parameters. Quantθ(ln wi| Xi) denotes the θth conditional quantile of ln w 
given X. The θth regression quantile, 0<θ <1, is defined as a solution to the 
problem 
 
which, after defining the check function ρθ (z)=θz if z≥ 0 or ρθ (z)=(θ –1)z if z 
< 0, can be written as  
 
This problem is solved using linear programming methods, where standard 
errors for the vector of coefficients are obtained using the bootstrap method 
described in Buchinsky (1998). It must be noted that if the underlying model 
were a location model, that is, changes in the explanatory variables 
                                                 
7 These two patterns are clearly illustrated by the country with the lowest education level, Portugal, 
in which the incidence of over-qualification is lowest and the incidence of incorrect qualification is 
highest among European countries. 
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producing changes only in the location, not in the shape, of the conditional 
wage distribution, then all the slope coefficients would be the same for all θ.  
We use the following earnings equation  
 
where ln wi is the logarithm of the gross monthly wage and Xi is a vector of 
explanatory variables, including age, job tenure, unemployment experience, 
marital status, health problems affecting daily life, highest education level, 
fixed term or casual employment, establishment size, and one-digit 
industry. The construction of these variables is described in Appendix A. 
The dummies uppersec and tertiary are activated only when the individual’s 
maximum level of education is, respectively, upper secondary or tertiary 
education. Thus, less than upper secondary is the excluded education 






4. Empirical results 
 
In this section we calculate the average effect of overeducation on wages 
as well as the effects at eleven selected quantiles. We proceed in two 
steps. First, we pool all the countries together and run a joint regression 
                                                 
8 The use of a categorical variable is inspired by previous work by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Chevalier (2003). An alternative specification is the ORU model, 
in which years of schooling are decomposed into required, surplus and deficit years of schooling in 
relation to those necessary to do the job (for a detailed description of these models, see Hartog, 
2000). We do not investigate this specification, as our data does not contain sufficient information 
to asses the schooling level required in a job.  




























allowing for country effects
9. Then, we run the wage regression separately 
for each country. The results for the overeducation coefficient are reported 
in Table 2. 
 
-------------------- Insert Table 2 ------------------- 
 
A glance to the OLS estimates shows that in Europe overeducated workers 
earn less, ceteris paribus, than similarly educated workers whose skills are 
fully utilized. The estimated differential amounts to 7.7% in the pooled 
sample. Differentiating across countries, we find that the overeducation pay 
penalty varies from the highest, about 10.9% in Denmark, to the lowest, 
2.6% in Portugal. Two groups of countries can be observed. In the first 
group, the largest, we include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Spain. In these countries, the pay penalty of 
overeducation exceeds 5% and is statistically significant. In the second 
group, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and the UK, the estimated effect is below 
5% and fails to be statistically significant.  
 
An important feature of our analysis is comparability. A review of the 
literature reveals that the estimates of the overeducation wage effect differ 
largely across studies, ranging from almost zero up to 30% (Hartog, 2000, 
and McGuiness, 2006). Implicitly, such variation puts forward the question 
of to what extent differences across studies reflect true differences rather 
than differences in the model specification, the use of different definitions of 
educational mismatch, diverging datasets and differently defined sample of 
                                                 
9 In the pooled sample the sampling weights have been rescaled so that each country’s relative size 
in the sample is equal to its relative size in census data. Specifically, the sampling weight of 
country’s i observation j in the pooled sample is ωj,i= (γi/αi) ·ρj,i·, where γi is the ratio between 
country’s i population and the population of all countries included in the ECHP according to 
census data, αi is country’s i sample size relative to the ECHP sample size, and ρj,i is the original 




























individuals. Our estimates, which are fully comparable and comprised in the 
3%-11% interval, suggest that variation across countries is lower than 
previously thought. They also provide consisting evidence that, as far as 
our definition of overeducation is concerned, overeducated workers tend to 
earn less relative to their well matched counterparts. 
 
Next, we turn to the quantile estimates. We find that the wage effects of 
overeducation are not homogeneous across the conditional wage 
distribution. In the pooled sample, the estimated effect ranges from 3.1% in 
the θ=0.10 quantile (Q10) to 10.8% in the θ=0.90 quantile (Q90). Similarly, 
the country-specific estimates uncover important differences across 
quantiles regarding the size and statistical significance of the overeducation 
coefficient.  
 
In Figures 1 and 2 we have depicted the quantile estimates together with 
their 5% confidence interval and the OLS estimates. As is apparent from 
the profiles, in the European labour market the wage effects of 
overeducation differ across segments of the distribution. In Table 3 we have 
tested whether such variations are significant at conventional confidence 
levels. The results for the pooled sample are clear-cut: according to the 
pair-wise tests, the differential between any two of the selected quantiles is 
statistically significant. Similarly, the F-test reported in the last column 
indicates that differences across all quantiles are jointly significant. This 
evidence confirms that in the European labour market the wage effects of 
overeducation can not be well described in an average sense.  
 
Turning to the country-by-country estimates, we find that in Denmark, 
Finland, France, Italy and Spain the F-statistics as well as the pair-wise 
tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients. In these 
countries, therefore, the overeducation effect can be described reasonably 




























capture all the action taking place at different parts of the wage distribution. 
In Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the UK 
differences between the selected quantiles tend to be statistically 
significant.  
 
Among those countries where the overeducation effect is found to differ 
significantly across quantiles we detect two different profiles. In Europe as a 
whole as well as in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the UK the 
overeducation pay penalty is found to be increasing when moving up along 
the wage distribution. In the pooled sample, the penalty is 7.7 percentage 
points higher at the top quantile than at the bottom quantile. Similarly, the 
estimate goes from 7.9% at the first quantile to 18.8% at the top quantile in 
Austria, from 2.1% to 10.0% in Germany, from 2.5% to 8.6% in Portugal, 
and from 0.1% to 8.4% in the UK. On the other side, we have Belgium and 
Greece. In these two countries the overeducation pay penalty tends to 
decrease as we move up along the wage distribution. In Belgium, the 
estimated effect goes from 11.2% in the first quantile to 3.4%, while in 
Greece it increases from the first to the third decile and then decreases 
from the third to the top decile.  
 
4.1. Implications for the wage distribution 
 
QR estimates can be used to describe the conditional wage distribution of 
different population groups (Buchinsky, 1994). In this sub-section, we use 
our regression results to compare the conditional wage distribution of 
adequately educated and overeducated workers.  
 
We start by analyzing Europe as a whole. As shown above, the average 
impact of overeducation on wages is negative and significant in the pooled 
sample. This can be represented by a shift (to the left) of the conditional 




























variation across quantiles, indicating that overeducation affects not only the 
location of the distribution (through its average effect) but also the shape of 
the distribution (through differences across quantiles). In Table 4 we report 
the differential in the overeducation coefficient between individuals that are 
located at different quantiles of the distribution. We find that overeducation 
contributes to reduce wage differences between individuals at high-pay and 
low-pay jobs, as it carries a larger penalty for those that precisely earn 
more (those located at the upper quantiles). To put it different, in Europe 
the conditional wage distribution of overeducated workers is, ceteris 
paribus, less dispersed than the distribution of adequately educated 
workers. 
 
Differentiating among countries, we detect three different groups. In the 
largest group, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
the UK, the overeducated exhibit less wage dispersion than their well 
matched counterparts, as it was found in the pooled sample. In the second 
group, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and Spain, conditional wage 
dispersion is similar between the overeducated and the adequately 
educated, as in these countries the impact of overeducation is uniform over 
the conditional wage distribution. Finally, in the third group, Greece and 
Belgium, overeducated workers exhibit more dispersion than their well-
matched counterparts. Still, this result should be interpreted cautiously in 
the case of Greece, as in this country wage dispersion among the 
overeducated tends to be, relative to the adequately educated, lower at the 
bottom tail and greater in the middle and upper quantiles of the distribution. 
 
4.2 Overeducation and unobserved skills 
 
As we have shown, the wage impact of overeducation shows important 
variation across individuals that have the same observable characteristics 




























several factors that can potentially account for this variation. Arguably, 
differences in the degree of overeducation, field of education, and the 
interaction between mismatched work and specific job characteristics may 
importantly affect individual’s earnings. Consistent with this view, Green et 
al (1999) and McGuiness (2003b) find that the mismatch between actual 
skills and skills required for the job is lower among graduates from technical 
and scientific areas and higher among graduates from humanities and arts. 
In the present study, however, we do not explore these factors due to data 
limitations.  
 
There is, however, one important avenue that we can explore: unobserved 
skills. In the quantile regression framework, the estimates at different 
quantiles represent the effects of a given covariate for individuals that have 
the same observable characteristics but, due to unobservable 
characteristics, are located at different quantiles of the conditional 
distribution. Therefore, those workers that end up in high-pay jobs (located 
at the upper part of the wage distribution) are those who have more 
productive skills, where by productive skills we indicate the ability, better 
academic credentials, motivation, etc., to earn a higher wage given a vector 
of observable characteristics. Having the labour market segmented by skill 
deciles, with individual skills indexed by the individual’s position in the 
conditional wage distribution, then differences in the wage effects of 
overeducation across conditional quantiles can be interpreted as 
differences between skill groups.  
 
Interestingly, we find that overeducation is an event that reduces wages 
amongst all skills groups. If overeducation was simply a consequence of 
low skills, then its influences should be restricted to the lower segments of 
the earnings distribution. In turn, we find that with the exception of Belgium 
and Greece, in all countries the pay penalty of overeducation among the 




























2). In most countries, indeed, individuals with high (unobservable) skills are 
exposed to a larger wage decrease if they end up in mismatched work.  
 
Green et al. (1999) and McGuiness (2003a) report evidence that the 
overeducation effect persist even after controlling for skill differences. Our 
results are consistent with this view. In turn, Chevalier (2003) finds that part 
of the estimated wage differential between overeducated and adequately 
educated workers can be explained by controlling for skill differences. 
Specifically, his results show that to some extent the overeducated earn 
less because they are less skilled. Here, we provide an alternative view: 
overeducated individuals are a distinct subset of any skill group, earnings 
less than similarly educated peers. There are at least two factors that may 
explain the divergence between our study and Chevalier’s results. First, we 
do not examine the earnings differential between overeducated workers 
who have different skills, but the differential between overeducated and 
adequately educated workers with similar (unobserved) skills. Second, we 
use a broad definition of skills, including all those unmeasured 
characteristics that actually affect the worker’s position in the wage 
distribution. Chevalier (2003), in turn, bases his results on test scores and 
degree classifications, which may be very specific and may not capture a 




In this paper we used international comparable data to assess the extent 
and wage effects of overeducation in Europe. We found that more than one 
fifth of the working population in Europe lacks qualifications commensurate 
with their jobs. 
 
In line with previous work, we found that overeducated workers earn less 




























ranging from a non-significant 3% in Portugal to a significant 11% in 
Denmark. The range of estimates is relatively small, suggesting that most 
part of the variation across studies found in the literature is due to 
differences in the earnings equation, alternative definitions of educational 
mismatch, and diverging estimating samples. 
 
Using QR we explored the wage effects of overeducation across the 
conditional wage distribution. We found significant differences across 
quantiles regarding the overeducation wage effect. This finding warns 
researchers in the field that restricting the analysis of the wage impact of 
overeducation to averages may miss important information.  
 
By differentiating between quantiles, we discriminated between groups of 
workers with different (unobservable) skills. We found that the detrimental 
effects of overeducation among the high-skilled are, if not higher, as large 
as amongst the low skilled. This was interpreted as evidence that 
overeducation is an event that reduces the worker’s potential productivity, 
regardless of his skills. Our results, therefore, lend further support to the 
view that the overeducation pay penalty emerges, at least in part, from an 
imperfect matching between the worker’s productivity potential and the job’s 
productivity ceiling. 
 
We used our QR estimates to describe how overeducation affects the 
location and the shape of the conditional wage distribution. We found that 
wage levels as well as wage dispersion tend to be lower within the 
overeducated.   
 
 
Appendix. Description of data source and estimating samples 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is available from 1994 




























households and individuals, who are interviewed over time. They report 
personal and family characteristics, including marital and educational 
status, as well as gross monthly wages and worked hours. We have 
dropped workers with a monthly wage rate that is less than 10% or over 10 
times the average wage. This correction for outliers affects an small 
proportion of the total sample. The wave chosen is 2001 for all countries 
except for Germany, Finland and UK, in which we choose 1996, since 
questions about overeducation are not available. We describe the variables 
used in the analysis.  
 
Gross monthly wage. Defined as monthly gross salary in the main job 
divided by four times the weekly hours worked in the main job.  
Level of education. Individuals are asked to report the maximum level of 
completed schooling, according to three categories: less than upper 
secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. These education 
categories are constructed following the ISCED-97 classification. 
Experience. Defined as age minus age of first job.  
Tenure. Defined as the difference between the year of the survey and the 
year of the start of the current job. We have constructed three categories: 
from 1 to 4 years, from 5 to 14 years, and 15 years or more. 
Married. It is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is married, 
zero otherwise.  
Immigrant. It is a dummy activated if the individual was born in a foreign 
country. 
Industry. It is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual works in the 
industry sector, zero if he works in the service sector. The agricultural 
sector was dropped on the account of the particularities of this sector. 
Firm size. Individuals are asked to report the number of employees that 
actually work in their firm. We have constructed four categories, from 1 to 
19 employees, from 20 to 99 employees, from 100 to 499 employees, and 




























Unemployment experience. Individuals are asked to report the existence 
of any unemployment period before current job.  
Health. Individuals are asked about their health in general.  
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Educational     
   Overqualification 59.46 51.72 68.48 62.95 62.82 55.25 67.82 49.11 46.75 48.46 41.63 59. 68.26 
   Incorrect  42.49  27.96 28.26 27.51 29.06 48.23 20.46 64.94 36.04 67.91 68.07 47. 31.74 
   Overeducation  21.92  15.61 19.13 19.33 20.09 23.68 14.29 29.81 16.26 30.35 25.47 25. 19.42 
Education     
   Less than upper  25.83  8.40 23.70 12.02 14.74 63.08 18.79 34.33 32.11 42.58 76.59 47. 31.82 
   Upper secondary  35.46  83.36 33.70 53.41 52.99 8.95 50.64 41.11 43.22 44.93 14.54 21. 35.54 
   Tertiary  25.83  8.23 42.61 34.57 32.26 27.97 30.56 24.56 24.66 12.49 8.86 30. 32.64 
   Average education
(a) 1.87 1.99 2.19 2.23 2.17 1.65 2.12 1.90 1.92 1.70 1.32 1.8 2.00 
 
(a) Average of a variable that takes value ‘3’ if the highest level of education attained by the individual is tertiary education, ‘2’ if upper 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                
No. of 
obs.  17212  1162  916 696 834 1609  1563  1231  733 1947  2031  2210  926 
 
Notes to Table 2: i) 
* signals significant at the 10% level, 
** signals significant at the 5% level, and 
*** signals significant at the 1% 
level; ii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iii) standard errors, in parenthesis, have been calculated using a bootstrap 
method of 500 replications; iv) Controls: age, job tenure, unemployment experience, marital status, health problems affecting 
daily life, highest education level, fixed term or casual employment, establishment size, and one-digit industry. 
 
TABLE 3: TESTS FOR THE EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS AT DIFFERENT QUANTILES (P-VALUE) 
EUROPE  Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Joint 
equality           
Q10 0 07 0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
Q25 00 0 00 0 00 0

































M  Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Joint 
equality 
Q10 0 81 0 92 0 96 0 06 00 6 Q10 0 45 0 17 0 06 0 25 0 20 Q25 06 3 07 6 00 2 Q25 0 20 0 04 0 37
Q50 09 3 00 2 Q50 0 20 0 96
Q75 0 00 Q75 0 24
DENMARK          
FINLAN
D        
Q10 0 85 0 83 0 93 0 85 0 98 Q10 0 72 0 43 0 33 0 44 0 68
Q25 0 91 0 91 0 67 Q25 0 20 0 15 0 37
Q50 0 75 0 56 Q50 0 50 0 91
Q75 0 61 Q75 0 70
FRANCE          
GERMA
NY        
Q10 0 43 0 91 0 38 0 75 0 59 Q10 0 10 0 01 0 01 0 08 0 07
Q25 0 39 0 75 0 78 Q25 0 09 0 05 0 40
Q50 0 19 0 73 Q50 0 69 0 80
Q75 0 45 Q75 0 52
GREECE          
IRELAN
D        
Q10 00 2 07 1 05 8 08 0 00 3 Q10 03 2 04 0 00 5 04 2 01 9
Q25 00 2 01 2 00 4 Q25 08 4 01 8 09 9
Q50 06 4 04 4 Q50 01 3 09 0
Q75 02 5 Q75 02 6
ITALY          
PORTUG
AL        
Q10 07 7 05 0 09 8 09 0 07 4 Q10 02 6 0 67 06 7 01 3 00 1
Q25 04 6 07 3 09 2 Q25 04 6 06 4 00 1
Q50 02 1 05 5 Q50 09 6 00 2
Q75 08 5 Q75 00 0




























Q10 07 1 08 6 09 5 09 3 09 9 Q10 08 6 05 7 01 4 02 8 03 8
Q25 08 0 07 2 08 2 Q25 05 2 00 7 02 2
Q50 08 6 09 4 Q50 00 7 03 6
Q75 09 4 Q75 07 0
Notes to Table 3: i) The element in the Qj column and the Qi row is the p-value of a pair-wise test between the estimates at 
the j and the i quantiles,     ,   H i j β β = : 0   
     : i j β β ≠ 1 H ; ii) the joint equality test reports the p-value of the F-test   ,   H 0.90 0.20 0.10 β β β = = = ... : 0     H   n m β β ≠ : 1 for some n m ≠ ; iii) p-
value < 0.10: significant at the 10% confidence level, p-value < 0.05: significant at the 5% confidence level, p-value < 0.01: 
significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 


































0.078 -0.018  -0.084  -0.017 -0.121*  0.016  -0.078 
-
0.008 











































































































































































Notes to Table 4: i) 
* signals significant at the 10% level, 
** signals significant at the 5% level, and 











































































FIGURE 2. QUANTILE RETURN PROFILE OF THE OVEREDUCATION PAY PENALTY – EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
   
 
























































    
 


























































    
 





























Notes: Grey line: quantile estimates, Red lines: 5% confidence intervals, Dotted line: OLS estimate. 
 